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PUNISIIlNG HATEFUL MOTIVES: OLD WINE
IN A NEW BOTTLE REVIVES CALLS
FOR PROHIBITION
Carol S. Steiker*
HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY Pouncs. By James B.
Jacobs and Kimberly Potter. New York: Oxford University Press.

1998. Pp.

viii,

212. $24.95.

"Hate crimes" are nothing new: crimes in which the victim is
selected because of the victim's membership in some distinctive
group (be it racial, ethnic, religious, or other) have been with us as
long as such groups have coexisted within legal systems. What is
relatively new is their recognition and designation as a discrete phe
nomenon. But as appellations like "sexual harassment" and "com
munity policing" have begun to teach us, words are only the
beginning of the life cycle of a new socio-legal concept. What fol
lows are debates about whether the new category is really a coher
ent one, what activities should fall within and outside of it, what
legal and social strategies should regulate these activities, and, inev
itably, whether the whole thing was a good idea in the first place,
given the consequences that followed.
The concept of "hate crimes" would be cresting if it were a
wave; to stick with the life-cycle metaphor, it is in the prime of its
life. Legislators on both the federal and state levels are busy draft
ing and debating new hate crime laws.1 Courts, including the
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Harvard Law School.
A.B. 1982, Harvard-Radcliffe Colleges; J.D. 1986, Harvard Law School. - Ed. I thank Dan
Kahan, Jordan Steiker, and Bill Stuntz for helpful suggestions.
1. Jacobs and Potter report that by 1995, "the federal government, thirty-seven states, and
the District of Columbia had passed hate crime laws that fall into four categories: (1) sen
tence enhancements; (2) substantive crimes; (3) civil rights statutes; and (4) reporting stat
utes." P. 29. Legislative initiatives to pass even more such laws continue. See, e.g., Reno
Urges Expansion of Hate-Crime Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at A12. (discussing the
progress of the White House's Hate Crimes Prevention Act in Congress); Hate Crime Penalty
Adjustment Proposed, UPI, Jan. 25, 1999, available in LEXIS, UPI file. (describing the intro·
duction of legislation in the California State Legislature that would make life in prison with
out parole the penalty for all hate crime murders, regardless of whether the motivation was
based on race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability). In the wake of the
Sheppard murder in Laramie, Wyoming, see infra note 4, bills have been proposed in both
Houses of the Wyoming legislature providing both for enhanced penalties and special report
ing procedures in hate crime cases. See WY H.B. 117, 55th Wyoming Legislature, introduced
January 13, 1999; WY H.B. 193, 55th Wyoming Legislature, introduced January 15, 1999; WY
H.B. 206, 55th Wyoming Legislature, introduced January 15, 1999; WY S.B. 84, Wyoming
55th Legislature, introduced January 14, 1999; WY S.B. 91, Wyoming 55th Legislature, intro
duced January 14, 1999. In the wake of the Byrd homicide in Jasper, Texas, see infra note 5,
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United States Supreme Court, have been called upon to rule on
constitutional issues raised by such laws.2 Academics have been
publishing articles and books on the topic at a furious rate.3 The
general public has been continually engaged in the debate by the
intense media attention the topic has attracted, especially in the
wake of such high-profile crimes as the gruesome murders last year
of Matthew Sheppard, an openly gay student at the University of
Wyoming who was beaten, tied to a fence, and left to die by
homophobic assailants;4 and of James Byrd, Jr., a black man who
was chained to the back of a pickup truck and dragged to his death
in Texas by ex-convicts with ties to white supremacist groups.5 Pro
ponents of hate crime laws point to heinous crimes like these as
evidence of the need for enhanced law enforcement tools; they ar
gue that realization of our collective commitment to social equality
depends on such government initiatives. Opponents of hate crime
laws contend that general laws prohibiting assault, murder, and the
like are sufficient for even the most egregious offenses and that the
many costs of hate crime laws far outweigh their benefits.

bills have been proposed in both Houses of the Texas legislature that would expand on the
hate crime reporting and enforcement procedures already in place. See TX H.B. 868, Texas
16th Legislature, introduced January 22, 1999; TX S.B. 439, Texas 76th Legislature, intro·
duced February 8, 1999.
2. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), revg. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d
807 (WIS. 1992); In re M.S., 876 P.2d 1365 (Cal. 1995); People v. Baker, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 372
(Cal. 1993); Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Wyant, 597
N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992), revd. by 624 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1994); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558
(Or. 1992) (en bane).
3. In addition to the book that is the subject of this review, Harvard University Press has
recently published FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAs CRIMES UNDER
AMERICAN LAW, a comprehensive defense of hate crime laws. See also JACK LEVIN & JACK
McDEvrrr, HATE CRIMES: THE RisING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED (1993); LU·IN
WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW (1998); BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
LEGAL REsPoNSES (Robert J. Kelly ed., 1993); HATE CRIME: THE GLOBAL PoLmcs OF
POLARIZATION (Robert J. Kelly & Jess Maghan eds., 1998); HATE CRIMES (Paul A. Winters
ed., 1996). Major law review articles published in the last ten years are too numerous to list,
but they probably peaked around 1993 with the Supreme Court's decision in the Mitchell case
and two major symposia: Symposium, Hate Crimes, 199211993 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 483
(1993) and the Criminal Justice Ethics Symposium on Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes
in 1992.
4. See Associated Press, Task Force Urges Hate Crime Laws, BoSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14,
1998, at AS; James Brooke, After Beating of Gay Man, Town Looks at Its Attitudes, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at A12; Ruben Castaneda, Hate Crime Laws Rely on Motives, Not
Targets: Laurel Slaying Illustrates Fine Line, WASH. PoST., Oct. 26, 1998, at Dl.
5. See Rick Bragg, In Wake of Texas Killing, Black Militants and Klan Trade Words, Not
Blows, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1998, § 1, at 17; Rick Lyman, A Guilty Verdict in Texas Dragging
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, § 4 (Week in Review), at 2; Michael Saul, City Urges Tight·
ening State Hate-Crimes Law; Council Members Cite Wyoming, Jasper Cases, DALLAS MORN·
ING NEws, Mar. 23, 1999, at 18A.
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James B. Jacobs6 and Kimberly Potter7 emphatically add their
voices to the latter chorus. Indeed, Hate Crimes: Criminal Law &
Identity Politics often has something of the quality of an advocate's
brief on the subject, in which it turns out that every conceivable
argument in favor of hate crime legislation is simply wrong. Build
ing on some of their earlier work, Jacobs and Potter examine hate
crime laws from every possible angle and find nothing, except per
haps good intentions, to recommend them (p. 145). The authors
begin with conceptual difficulties in the use of hate crime as a cate
gory. They elaborate on the challenges of defining prejudice and
:figuring out which prejudices should be covered by hate crime laws
(pp. 11-21). Moreover, even if these initial conceptual hurdles
could be cleared, they argue, determining the causal relationship
between prejudice and action is further fraught with problems (pp.
21-27). Potter and Jacobs go on to argue that there really is no need
for hate crime laws anyway, marshaling criminological research to
contest claims that we are witnessing a hate crime "epidemic" (pp.
45-64). A bit inconsistently, they then assert that there is nothing
inherently worse about hate crimes than ordinary crimes committed
without bias (implicitly suggesting that even an "epidemic" of hate
crimes should not be a cause of special concern) (pp. 79-91). In
addition to being unnecessary, contend Jacobs and Potter, hate
crime laws are affirmatively harmful in that they pose serious
problems of enforcement (pp. 92-93), violate the Constitution by
punishing people for "politically incorrect opinions and viewpoints"
(pp. 128, 111-29), and "undermine social solidarity" by reinforcing
"identity politics" (pp. 144, 130-44).
This is an impassioned book, both bene:fitted and burdened by
the emotional investment that passion lends to analysis and advo
cacy. On the debit side, Potter and Jacobs sometimes seem one
sided in their presentation of controversies by not always present
ing the arguments of their adversaries in the most fair or compelling
fashion,8 or by requiring more empirical support from their adver
saries than they are able to provide for their own policy prescrip6. Director of New York University's Center for Research in Crime and Justice, and Pro
fessor of Law at New York University School of Law.
7. Former Senior Research Fellow at New York University's Center for Research in
Crime and Justice, now in private law practice in Bronxville, New York.
8. For example, in their chapter on "The Politics of Hate Crime Laws" (Chapter 5),
Jacobs and Potter suggest that the primary purpose of what they term "interest groups" in
"lobbying" for hate crimes legislation is to "boost[ ] the morale and the status of the
[identity-based advocacy] organizations and their constituencies." P. 66. This claim that pure
self-interest has led victimized groups to embrace victimhood in order to "assert a moral
claim to special entitlements and affirmative action" (p. 66) ignores the possibility that
people of diverse identities migbt support hate crime laws (or affirmative action) on the basis
of some principled view of what justice requires, rather than because of a prediction about
how their own personal well-being migbt be enhanced.
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tions.9 On the credit side, however, the book's comprehensive
treatment of its subject is likely to give it broad appeal; the wide
ranging scope of the arguments against hate crime laws assembled
by Jacobs and Potter enhances the likelihood that the book will
have some impact upon a diverse audience. Those who are not con
vinced of the insurmountability of the conceptual problems might
well find the empirical case against hate crime laws compelling, or
the philosophical case, or the constitutional case, or the pragmatic
case, based on the myriad issues raised by Jacobs and Potter regard
ing investigation, litigation, and data collection in hate crime cases.
Approaching the book without a passionate commitment of my
own, but leaning by general inclination the other way, I found
myself engaged, although not necessarily convinced, by many of its
arguments. I certainly can say that I :finished the book considerably
more thoughtful and, indeed, more troubled than when I began.
Rather than attempt any comprehensive assessment of the dis
parate arguments advanced in the book, I focus my attention here
on one particular argument - that hate crime laws are unconstitu
tional (and also a bad idea) because, by punishing disfavored dis
criminatory motives for criminal acts, they impermissibly punish
thought. This argument, the subject of Chapter Eight of Hate
Crimes, is but one arrow in the authors' hefty quiver of arguments
against hate crime legislation. I focus on it, however, partly because
it is an argument opponents of hate crime laws advance with great
frequency and vehemence,10 and partly because I find this argu
ment puzzling every time I come across it. By exploring the source
of my puzzlement, I hope to advance two arguments of my own:
first, that hate crime legislation is not a significant departure from
the rest of the substantive criminal law, and second, that the failure
9. For example, in their chapter on "Justification for Hate Crime Laws" (Chapter 6),
Jacobs and Potter take to task supporters of hate crime legislation for failing to produce
sufficient empirical support for their claims that hate crime victims suffer greater psycholo·
gical and emotional injury than other victims (pp. 82-83) and that hate crimes cause unusually
substantial harm to innocent third parties (pp. 86-87). In the same chapter, however, Jacobs
and Potter argue against the need for greater deterrence of hate crimes by asserting rather
vaguely that "it is not clear that the threat of a penalty enhancement will have any marginal
deterrent effect" (p. 89). Similarly, they reject the "moral education" argument for hate
crime legislation by stating simply "we think it unlikely that hate crime laws add much moral
education to the huge body of denunciation of crime and prejudice that already exists" (p.
91). Jacobs and Potter may be right on these last points, but you would not know it from
their empirical support.
10. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Pamela Moorshead, Bad Laws Make Hard Cases: Hate
Crime Laws and the Supreme Court's Opinion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 30 GONZAGA L. REv.
1, 27 (1994/95) ("Laws that target motives, particularly motives which are beliefs about issues
like race, religion, or politics, threaten our constitutional right to believe what we will, re·
gardless of how unfounded or offensive our beliefs might be."); Susan Gellman, Sticks and
Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy
Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REv. 333, 362 (1991) (arguing that hate
crime laws "criminalize pure thought and opinion").
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of many commentators (Jacobs and Potter among them) to recog
nize this continuity camouflages the extent to which the debate sur
rounding hate crime laws is fundamentally grounded in differences
about politics or political strategy.

I.

ARE HATE CRIME LAWS DIFFERENT FROM TIIE REST OF TIIE
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW?

The argument that hate crime laws are unconstitutional under
the First Amendment is based on a view of hate crime legislation as
radically discontinuous with the rest of substantive criminal law.
Under this view, hate crime laws represent a dangerous departure
from the heartland of (appropriate) criminal prohibitions in that
they punish speech and thought in much - or even exactly - the
same way that laws directly criminalizing offensive expression do.
Thus, the chapter that Jacobs and Potter devote to this argument
begins with a discussion of the history and legal permissibility of so
called "hate speech" regulation (pp. 112-21). Jacobs and Potter
build up to the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in R.A. V. v. St.
Paul, 11 in which the Court unanimously rejected as unconstitutional
an ordinance criminalizing as a form of "disorderly conduct" the
placing of symbols or graffiti like (but not limited to) "a burning
cross or Nazi swastika" when one knows or should know that such
symbols will cause offense "on the basis of race, color, creed, reli
gion, or gender . . . ."12 The majority opinion for the Court
"acknowledged that the government could criminalize constitution
ally unprotected fighting words, but insisted that the government
could not criminalize only those fighting words that express ideas
that the government disfavors" (p. 124). For Jacobs and Potter, this
reasoning rejecting a hate crime law that criminalized purely ex
pressive behavior necessarily entails the rejection of hate crime
laws that enhance the punishment of people who engage in criminal
behavior when motivated by disfavored attitudes.
Thus, Jacobs and Potter find the Supreme Court's

1993

decision

Wisconsin v. Mitchell13 both unfathomable and indefensible. In
Mitchell, the Court - once again unanimously - upheld the con
in

stitutionality of Wisconsin's hate crime statute authorizing an in
creased sentence for any offender who intentionally selects a victim
"because of race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, na
tional origin or ancestry."14 The Court distinguished its decision of
the previous year on the ground that "whereas the ordinance struck
down in R.A. V. was explicitly directed at expression (i.e., 'speech'
11.
12.
13.
14.

505 U.S.
505 U.S.
508 U.S.
508 U.S.

377 (1992).
at 380 (quoting St. Paul city ordinance).
476 (1993).
at 480 (quoting Wrsconsin statute).
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or 'messages'), the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unpro
tected by the First Amendment."15 To Jacobs and Potter, this dis
tinction is wholly unconvincing because "the point remains that the
sentence enhancement is triggered by some prejudices and not
others. A similarly situated offender, who engaged in the same con
duct, but for reasons of personal jealousy or spite, would have re
ceived one-third the sentence that Mitchell received" (p. 126).
Viewed in this way, through the lens of First Amendment limita
tions on hate speech regulation, the Court's refusal to limit hate
crime regulation in a similar fashion can seem oddly contradictory
- an exercise in aridly formalistic line drawing, as Jacobs and
Potter contend. But viewed through the lens of the substantive
criminal law, it is the limitations urged by Jacobs and Potter - not
the new hate crime laws - that seem oddly contradictory and out
of sync. This is the source of my puzzlement each time I encounter
arguments like those advanced by Jacobs and Potter. For it seems
obvious that the criminal law frequently makes the definition of
criminal offenses and sentencing options turn on some qualitative
evaluation of the offender's reasons for acting. Indeed, the Mitchell
Court buttressed its unanimous validation of Wisconsin's sentenc
ing enhancement provision by invoking judges' "[t]raditional[ ]"
consideration of "[t]he defendant's motive for committing the of
fense" in making sentencing determinations.16
Jacobs and Potter recognize that the Court "may have been con
cerned that striking down the Wisconsin law would have put in
doubt the constitutionality of all judicial sentencing based on mo
tive" (p. 126). In contrast to some constitutional critics of hate
crime laws,17 Jacobs and Potter do not go so far as to claim that
motive should play no role in criminal liability. In their view, how
ever, the Court's fear is nonetheless unfounded. According to
Jacobs and Potter, the kind of motives placed at issue by hate crime
laws are fundamentally different from those that the criminal law
ordinarily makes relevant:
Sentence enhancements for other motives often do not have the same
free speech implications. Unlike greed, jealousy, or simple cold
bloodedness, bigotry is often connected to a system of political beliefs
and is never content neutral. The concepts of prejudice and bigotry
are political to the core. Hate crime laws explicitly seek to punish
people for having bigoted beliefs. The Supreme Court did not even
begin to grapple with this issue. [p. 127]

15. 508 U.S. at 487 (citations omitted).
16. See 508 U.S. at 485 (citing general sources and going on to give specific examples
from capital sentencing cases).
17. See Gellman, supra note 10, at 364 ("Motive is nothing more than an actor's reason
for acting, the 'why' as opposed to the 'what' of the conduct. Unlike purpose or intent,
motive cannot be a criminal offense or an element of an offense.") (citations omitted).
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Thus, the primary bone of contention between Jacobs and Potter on
the one hand and the Mitchell Court on the other is this: Is the way
in which hate crime laws make motive relevant to crime and pun
ishment fundamentally the same or fundamentally different from
the operation of the rest of our substantive criminal law? I will
seek to elaborate upon the Court's intuition, which I share, that
hate crime laws are essentially continuous with the basic structure
of Anglo-American criminal law, and that a constitutional chal
lenge to the one necessarily calls the other into question.
Consider first the numerous criminal law doctrines that treat a
defendant's reasons for acting as partially or wholly exculpatory.
One of the best examples is the doctrine of mitigation in the law of
homicide. In general, the grading of homicides could be fairly
described as "stair-cased" based on degrees of intentionality, as
opposed to motive. That is, the law of homicide generally inquires
as to the degree to which the defendant chose to kill rather than the
defendant's reason for killing. Thus, first-degree murder is tradi
tionally murder that is "premeditated," while ordinary murder is
only intended or even super-reckless, and involuntary manslaughter
is merely ordinarily reckless or criminally negligent.18 In contrast
to this formal focus on intentionality, the category of voluntary
manslaughter is reserved for those killings that would otherwise be
murder based on the degree of intentionality present, but that are
mitigated by the existence of the defendant's "heat of passion"
caused by "reasonable provocation."19 The traditional, common
law view of adequate provocation included only a small number of
"paradigms of misbehavior"20 that could serve to mitigate the kill
ing of the provoker; these were: "(1) an aggravated assault or bat
tery; (2) mutual combat; (3) commission of a serious crime against a
close relative of the defendant; (4) illegal arrest; and (5) observa
tion by a husband of his wife committing adultery."21 Modem An
glo-American law has softened the rigidity of the common law
categories by often delegating to the jury the decision as to what
constitutes adequate provocation.2
2 Modem juries are generally in
structed along the lines that provocation is sufficient if it "might
render ordinary men, of fair average disposition, liable to act rashly
or without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion, rather
than judgment ...."23 The rationale usually offered for this partial
18. See WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw §§ 7.1-7.4, 7.7, 7.12
(2d ed. 1986).
19. See id. § 7.10.
20. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.07(B)(2)(a) (2d ed.
1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
21. Id. (citation omitted).
22. See id. § 31.07(B)(2)(b)(i).
23. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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defense to bring it in line with the ostensible focus of the rest of
homicide law is that it downgrades certain homicides based on the
impairment of the defendant's volition brought about by the emo
tion aroused by the provoking event.24
Two recent scholarly articles, however, persuasively demon
strate that this volitional view of "heat of passion" manslaughter is
simply inadequate. Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum mount a
comprehensive argument rejecting such a "mechanistic" account of
the law of provocation (as well as a wide variety of other criminal
law doctrines) in favor of an "evaluative" conception of the role of
emotion in criminal liability.25 In addition, Victoria Nourse has of
fered a devastating unmasking and critique of the evaluative judg
ments that lie just beneath the surface of the law of provocation and
passion.26 Both of these articles elaborate upon the way in which
the law of voluntary manslaughter "focuses on motives"27 and
makes normative evaluations of those motives. While Kahan and
Nussbaum's project is largely to demonstrate and defend the exist
ence of evaluation in the law of voluntary manslaughter (and the
criminal law generally), Nourse goes on to critique the substance of
the law's evaluation of motives in the manslaughter context.
Nourse compellingly demonstrates the way in which modem under
standings of provocation and passion "have actually helped to en
trench norms about relationships,"28 creating "a murder law that is
both illiberal and often perverse. "29
The relevance of a defendant's motive to criminal liability is not
by any means limited to the context of voluntary manslaughter,
although this doctrine presents an especially good vantage point
from which to consider the issue. On the contrary, a great many
other criminal law doctrines share this feature. Kahan and
Nussbaum's article goes on to develop their argument about the
criminal law's evaluative stance toward emotion in a number of
other doctrinal contexts, including the doctrines of premeditated
murder, self-defense, duress, involuntary act, and insanity.30 To
24. See id.; Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 Moo.
L. REv. 467, 479-80 (1988).
25. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 305-06 (1996).
26. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE LJ. 1331 (1997).
27. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 315.
28. Nourse, supra note 26, at 1337.
29. Id. at 1332.
30. Other scholars have made similar arguments about the significance of motive to crim
inal liability. See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role
ofMotive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 635, 747 ("This Article
has argued that the evil motive concept of mens rea plays a vital role within the context of
certain narrowly defined defenses but is generally undesirable at the offense definition
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their list, I would add the more general defense of necessity, of
which self-defense might be seen as a subspecies. In all of these
contexts, the law makes criminal liability (or, in the law of premedi
tation, the grade of criminal liability) tum on some normative eval
uation of the defendant's reasons for acting. Determinations about
which motivations are good ones or bad ones are deeply inscribed
in the law itself.
If this general argument is right - that the existence or degree
of criminal liability often turns on some normative evaluation of a
defendant's motive that is inscribed or "written into" the law what does it entail for Jacobs and Potter's argument that hate crime
laws punish motive in an impermissible way? Is the way hate crime
laws consider motive different in some important way from how,
say, the law of voluntary manslaughter does? Jacobs and Potter
contend that the motive singled out for special punishment by hate
crime laws - they call it "bigotry" - is different from other mo
tives, because "[u]nlike greed, jealousy, or simple cold-bloodedness,
bigotry is often connected to a system of political beliefs and is
never content neutral" (p. 127). But this argument does not seem
to distinguish between the motives of defendants who kill in the
"heat of passion" but without w:hat the law accepts as adequate
provocation and the motives of those who commit hate crimes. Im
agine, under either the traditional common law categories or mod
em, liberalized provocation law, the claim of "heat of passion" by a
white supremacist who becomes enraged and kills when he discov
ers that his daughter is romantically involved with a black man.
Clearly, such a discovery does not come even close to one of the
narrow categories of "adequate provocation" developed by the
common law. Even in a modem jurisdiction with a liberalized prov
ocation doctrine, a jury would likely conclude that the provoking
event was not one that would move a man "of fair average disposi
tion" to violence. Thus, the white supremacist gets punished more
- and considerably more, given that his crime is now murder
rather than manslaughter - because his racist attitudes are not
ones that the law recognizes as mitigating. Had he found his wife in
bed with another man (black or white), he would have a classic
partial defense of "heat of passion" based on adequate provocation.
level."); Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, 8 CRIM. JusT. ETHICS, Wmter/
Spring 1989, at 3, 5 (1989) ("I will argue that motive is relevant to criminal liability according
to virtually any conception of motive that satisfies the most minimal criteria of adequacy.")
(emphasis in original); Paul H. Robinson, Hate Crimes: Crimes of Motive, Character, or
Group Terror?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURv. OF AM. L. 605, 605 ("I will argue that motive ought to
be and commonly is, notwithstanding the claims to the contrary, an element in determining
liability or grade of offense."). The definitions of "motive" offered by these scholars is simi
lar in all salient respects to Kahan and Nussbaum's definition of "emotion;" indeed, Kahan
and Nussbaum sometimes refer to "motive" as synonymous with "emotion." See, e.g., Kahan
& Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 315.
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The law's choice to mitigate the latter killing itself inscribes, as
Nourse teaches us, deeply held views about the proper roles of men
and women in intimate relationships.31 Viewed in this way, the doc
trine of "adequate provocation" appears to be exactly what Jacobs
and Potter decry about hate crimes legislation - "political to the
core" (p. 127).
It is a bit difficult to come up with a precise parallel to the oper
ation of hate crime laws in the manslaughter (or other defense)
context: legal defenses mitigate or forego punishment based on a
less culpable motive, while hate crime laws aggravate or impose
punishment based on a more culpable one. But the law of sentenc
ing is consonant with the law of criminal liability. Just as the exist
ence or degree of criminal liability can often turn on a normative
evaluation of the defendant's reasons for acting, so too the degree
of punishment imposed after a finding of criminal liability often
turns on such an evaluation. The clearest examples of this tendency
are in the capital sentencing context, because constitutional con
straints on the imposition of the death penalty have led legislatures
to specify those circumstances that "aggravate" a murder so as to
make the defendant eligible for this punishment.32 As the Supreme
Court recognized in Mitchell, the death penalty is "surely the most
severe 'enhancement' of all."33 Death penalty statutes routinely
designate as aggravating circumstances motives for killing that are
considered worse than the usual motives a defendant might have
for committing a crime of violence.
The Mitchell Court gave as its primary example the fact that
many states treat murder committed for pecuniary gain as aggra
vated murder for which the defendant becomes death-eligible.34
One opponent of hate crime laws attempted to rebut this argument
by suggesting that "murder for hire is a different act than other
murder; the state is not seeking to punish or deter the motive of
profit-seeking, but the medial end of creating contracts to kill."35
The problem with this argument is that if states really were primar
ily concerned with punishing "contracts to kill," it would be odd
indeed to phrase the aggravating factor as "murder for pecuniary
31. See Nourse, supra note 26, at 1332 ("[O]ur most modem and enlightened legal ideal
of 'passion' reflects, and thus perpetuates, ideas about men, women, and their relationships
that society long ago abandoned.").
32. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding the wholly discretionary capital
punishment system that prevailed throughout the United States violative of the Eighth
Amendment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding a new capital punishment
scheme that guided sentencer discretion through the use of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances).
33. 508 U.S. 476, 486 (1993).
34. See 508 U.S. at 485 (citing capital statutes from Arizona, Florida, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Wyoming).
35. Gellman, supra note 10, at 365.
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gain." This latter locution would not necessarily include within its
ambit the solicitor of the contract who initiates it and pays the ac
tual killer, because such a solicitor might well be acting not for pe
cuniary gain at all, but rather engaging in an act of terrorism, or
jealously eliminating a rival lover, or settling an old score. It makes
much more sense to view the prevalent "pecuniary gain" aggravator
as inscribing the belief that killing for money is simply worse than
killing for some other reason.
But although the Mitchell Court saw that the "pecuniary gain"
aggravator supported its argument about the enhancement of pun
ishment based on motive, it oddly neglected the best examples in
capital punishment law of aggravating factors that designate certain
motivations as worse than others. A common aggravating factor in
state death penalty schemes asks whether the murder was "espe
cially heinous, cruel or depraved."36 The Arizona Supreme Court
interpreted "depraved" murder to mean murder where "the perpe
trator 'relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion'
or 'shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evi
dences a sense of pleasure' in the killing."37 In another case involv
ing the interpretation of this aggravating factor, the Arizona Court
elaborated: "Heinous and depraved involve the mental state and
attitude of the perpetrator as reflected in his words and actions .. ..
'[D]epraved' means 'marked by debasement, corruption, perversion
or deterioration.'"38 In Idaho, the death penalty statute permits the
finding of an aggravating circumstance when "the defendant exhib
ited utter disregard for human life,"39 which the Idaho Supreme
Court interpreted to mean when the defendant acted as a "cold
blooded, pitiless slayer.''40 In upholding this construction against
charges of excessive vagueness, the United States Supreme Court
explained, "The terms 'cold-blooded' and 'pitiless' describe the de
fendant's state of mind: not his mens rea, but his attitude toward
his conduct and his victim.''41 Every aggravating factor of this gen
eral type is frankly evaluative of the defendant's reasons for com
mitting the underlying killing and of the defendant's attitude
toward his victim and his act. Although this sort of aggravating fac36. This is the language of Arizona's statute, Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6)
(1989), although different states have other, similar locutions. Aggravating factors of this
type were first proposed and are probably based upon the Model Penal Code's formulation.
MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 210.6(3)(h) (Complete Text as Adopted 1962) ("The murder was
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.").
37. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990) (quoting 769 P.2d 1017, 1033
(en bane)).

(Ariz. 1989)

38. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 769-70 (1990) (quoting State v. Jeffers, 661 P.2d
1105, 1130 (Ariz. 1983) (citations omitted)).
39. IDAHO CODE

§ 19-2515(g)(6)

(1997).

40. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 472 (1993) (quoting 105 Idaho 362, 370 (1983)).
41. 507 U.S. at 473.
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tor has been constitutionally controversial, that conflict has re
volved around the potential breadth and vagueness of such factors
rather than their inherently evaluative nature.

It is hard to see how the valuations of defendants' reasons for
acting embodied in these death penalty statutes are any less "polit
ical" than the negative valuation of "bigotry" to which Jacobs and
Potter object. The enhancement for killing that brings "pleasure"
punishes the sexual sadist, or the killer who derives special satisfac
tion from killing a particular sort of victim (very much along the
lines of a hate crime law). The enhancement for killing "coldly" or
without "pity" punishes the terrorist or political activist who kills as
the calculated means toward a political end more than the jealous
husband or jilted lover. Even if there would be First Amendment
concerns raised by punishment for the expression of violent, sadistic
fantasies or for the expression of satisfaction at the prospect of
harm or death to certain disfavored people or groups, enhanced
punishment for killings done for such reasons are commonplace in
our law.
Moreover, even if Jacobs and Potter were still to insist that there
is something different and special about punishment for "bigoted"
motives, it is and has always been commonplace - in noncapital as
well as capital cases - to punish what we now call "hate crimes"
more than ordinary assaults or murder, even before a single hate
crime law was ever passed. In discretionary sentencing regimes,
which completely dominated the American sentencing scene until
quite recently and remain quite prevalent today, judges have wide
latitude to take into account all of the circumstances of a crime in
determining an appropriate penalty from what is often a very wide
range of permissible ones. As one classic treatise on criminal law
puts it: "Motives are most relevant when the trial judge sets the
defendant's sentence, and it is not uncommon for a defendant to
receive a minimum sentence because he was acting \vith good mo
tives, or a rather high sentence because of his bad motives."42 The
whole point of discretionary sentencing is to permit the sentencer to
take into account the relevant differences between crimes that the
formal offense definition of necessity leaves out, and very often dif
ferences in offender motivation fall into this category. Although
discretionary sentencing schemes have become less favored in re
cent years, with the federal government and a substantial minority
of states turning to sentencing guidelines,43 the primary legislative
purpose behind limiting judicial sentencing discretion has not been
to eliminate the sentencer's consideration of motive, but rather to
42. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra n o te 18, § 3.6(b).
43. See generally Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78
JUDICATURE

173 (1995).
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standardize sentencing in order to avoid disparities.44 Thus, both
traditional discretionary sentencing and the growing trend in guide
lines sentencing envision a role for the consideration of offender
motivation in sentencing.
Quite apart from judicial sentencing discretion, prosecutorial
charging discretion also has traditionally permitted the differentia
tion of punishment based upon offender motivation. It is axiomatic
in American law that "the American prosecutor has complete dis
cretion with respect to the selection of the charge. He can charge
the most serious offense or offenses, or charge one or more less
serious offenses."45' The exercise of prosecutorial discretion of
course involves a number of considerations, many of which are un
related to offender motive, such as resource considerations and
cooperation agreements. The prosecutor, however, will also con
sider "a great many different kinds of defendant-specific or case
specific factors"46 in determining whether or what to charge, and
these facts will necessarily include an evaluation of the defendant's
motives for committing the underlying offense, if they are evident
from the information available to the prosecutor. In contrast to the
movement to reduce or eliminate sentencing discretion, no success
ful institutional reform movement has limited in any substantial
way the charging discretion of prosecutors; indeed, many commen
tators have argued that recent limitations on sentencing discretion
have actually increased the amount and the significance of the pros
ecutor's discretion in charging.47 Thus, the very structure of our
44. See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1336,
1336 (1997) (describing and critiquing the Federal Sentencing Commission's "central preoc
cupation" with "reducing sentencing disparity"). Tue best evidence that the Federal Sentenc
ing Guidelines were meant not to eradicate but rather to standardize the consideration of
evidence of motive is the addition of § 3Al.1 by the Commission in response to the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which provides for a three-level upward
adjustment in the offense level where the defendant "intentionally selected any victim or any
property as the object of the offense of conviction because of the actual or perceived race,
color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any per
son." This particular "hate crime motivation" adjustment reflects a particular application of
the Guidelines' more general command that "relevant conduct" be taken into account at
sentencing, relevant conduct being defined as

§

"acts or omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or by a person for
whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable, that (1) are part of the same course
of conduct, or a common scheme or plan, as the offense of conviction, or (2) are relevant
to the defendant's state of mind or motive in committing the offense of conviction, or (3)
indicate the defendant's degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood."
1Bl.3(a) (as amended Nov. 1998) (italics added).

45. Norman Abrams, Prosecution: Prosecutorial Discretion,
CRIME & JUSTICE 1272, 1275 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).

in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

Id. at 1274.
See, e.g., William J. Powell & Michael T. Camino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 373
(1995); Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 1247 (1997).
46.

47.
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institutions of criminal justice deliberately create opportunities for
the exercise of discretion in determining the appropriate punish
ment for an offender based on offender motivation. These institu
tional arrangements only add to my sense that it is Jacobs and
Potter, rather than hate crime laws, that are out of step with the
administration of criminal justice in our country today.
II.

W"HY Do HATE CRIME LAWS SEEM DIFFERENT?

If hate crime laws do not treat defendants' motives differently
from the way much of the criminal law and the criminal justice sys
tem do, why is it that Jacobs and Potter, among many others, per
ceive something fundamentally different about such legislation?
1his is another puzzle to me, the answer to which Inight help ad
vance the current debate about the wisdom and efficacy of hate
crime laws. My sense is that hate crime laws Inight appear to be
new and different because the ways in which the rest of the criminal
law deals with disfavored motivation are hidden and hard to see. I
do not mean to suggest that the drafters of our current criminal law
codes or the generations of common law judges who developed the
foundations of our substantive criminal law intended to obscure the
true nature of their enterprise. Rather, I mean to suggest that cer
tain kinds of motivations were, and perhaps still are, so widely ac
cepted as Initigating or aggravating that the ways in which these
evaluations are written into the law do not seem like "evaluations"
at all. Rather, we Inight say that these evaluations simply "are" the
law. It is only when we attempt to inscribe new evaluations of moti
vation into the law, evaluations that are more contested than the
ones already long woven into the law's fabric, that we are able to
see clearly the act of evaluation at all.
Victoria Nourse has recently written a wonderful review of
James Q. Wilson's book on the so-called "abuse excuse"48 in which
she powerfully demonstrates how Wilson's calls for "moral judg
ment" in the criminal law lead him to criticize new kinds of de
fenses (such as the claims of battered women) without seeing how
more "traditional" defenses (such as the law of provocation) are
identical in their underlying structure to the ones he excoriates.49
Says Nourse: "If Wilson is to take judgment seriously, he cannot
indict some defenses for failing to judge - demanding that bat
tered women, for example, show more self-control - but not
others - partially excusing provoked men precisely when they do
48. JAMES Q. WILSON, MoRAL JUDGMENT: DoES THE ABusE Excuss THREATEN OuR
LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997).
49. See Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of
Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. Rsv. 1435 (1998).
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lose self-control."50 Wilson's inability to see that his defense of the
"traditional" law of provocation was a kind of "abuse excuse" itself,
arose from the uncontroversial nature of that traditional (partial)
excuse. For instance, men who were provoked by their wives' adul
tery to commit homicide did not need expert witnesses to testify
about "cuckolded husband syndrome" precisely because it was
taken for granted by the law (and society) that any "reasonable"
person would be moved to violent anger by such an experience. It
is only when law reformers seek to write in new judgments about
reasonableness that the evaluative nature of the criminal law ap
pears prominent and, necessarily, controversial.
But what, one might ask, is so new and controversial about the
evaluations that hate crime laws seek to add formally to the crimi
nal law? No one, and certainly not Jacobs or Potter, argues that
racial hatred (or other group-based animosity) is a social good. So
why should the negative valuation of such motivations in the crimi
nal law be so controversial? The first reason is the one that Jacobs
and Potter explicitly offer through their arguments about the consti
tutionality of hate crime laws: the criminal law should not "punish
people for [their] beliefs" (p. 127). The ways in which the criminal
law already does punish belief (by punishing disfavored reasons for
acting) are sometimes hard to see and apparently were not seen by
Jacobs and Potter. Thus, they would likely argue that the extent to ,
which the criminal law ever punishes belief in a way similar to hate
crime laws is similarly problematic. Their argument against hate
crime laws would necessarily extend to all valuations of motive by
the substantive criminal law. So, at the most open and obvious
level, hate crime laws are problematic for Jacobs and Potter be
cause they threaten a conception of the criminal law as "content
neutral" - to use a phrase that Jacobs and Potter borrow from First
Amendment law (p. 127). Jacobs and Potter seek to protect and
promote a criminal law that is "neutral" as to reasons for and atti
tudes about action, punishing only in accordance with the intent to
bring about certain proscribed harms. The normative attractiveness
of this conception of criminal law is an important question, one that
is very much engaged by recent scholars of substantive criminal law,
some of whom, in the words of Victoria Nourse, have posited a
"new normativity."51 But as these scholars have amply demon
strated, normative evaluation of reasons for action - of belief and
attitude - are hardly foreign to the criminal law as it now exists
and as it has long existed. Thus, to bar the door at hate crime laws
is a bit like barricading a house against an intruder who is already in
the living room with his feet up: the controversy over "content neu50. Id. at 1438.
51. Id. at 1456.
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trality" should not start with hate crime laws, but with the law of
homicide through and through, as the earlier examples indicate.
A second, less obvious reason why hate crime legislation seems
so new and controversial is that its strategy for combating racial
hatred is deeply controversial in our society right now. While the
disfavoring of racial and other group-based hatreds is not itself con
troversial, the appropriate means for combating such attitudes are
very much contested. Many - Jacobs and Potter clearly included
- question the wisdom and efficacy of strong group affiliations and
group-based policies on the grounds that such affiliations and poli
cies narrow identities and produce perverse incentives. These sorts
of concerns are evident in the very title of Jacobs and Potter's book,
which implies that hate crime laws are the product of what the au
thors term "identity politics." They define "identity politics" as "a
politics whereby individuals relate to one another as members of
competing groups based upon characteristics like race, gender, reli
gion, and sexual orientation" (p. 5). This definition reveals its
clearly pejorative nature in the use of the word "competing" - to
Jacobs and Potter, strong identification with an identity group im
plies a kind of zero-sum game. They go on to explain how such
"identity politics" create perverse incentives: "According to the
logic of identity politics, it is strategically advantageous to be recog
nized as disadvantaged and victimized....The ironic consequence
is that minority groups no longer boast about successes for fear that
success will make them unworthy of political attention" (p. 5).
What Jacobs and Potter fear most is that the recognition and de
ployment of group identities through law will ultimately serve to
"harden and exacerbate social divisions" (p. 10).
It is this second, more subtle controversy that I believe lies at
the heart of Jacobs and Potter's book. This controversy - about
the uses and abuses of group identity by law - explains both why
Jacobs and Potter see hate crime laws as so fundamentally different
from the rest of criminal law and why they are so passionate in their
attack on hate crime legislation. It might also explain why the de
bate over hate crimes laws should occupy a central place on our
political agenda, rather than be fought out on the more arid battle
field of constitutional doctrine.
III.

CONCLUSION: WHY SHOULD WE CARE?

Jacobs and Potter have written a telling book in two senses of
the word. First, the book makes a number of telling points about
deficiencies in the theory and practice of hate crime legislation from
a number of different perspectives - moral, political, and pru
dential. In particular, Jacobs and Potter's elaboration of the con
ceptual issues that remain unresolved in the debate over hate crime
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laws and their concern about the difficulties inherent in addressing
them is well-presented. Should gender be a hate crime category?
How can one tell whether violent crimes against women are com
mitted "because" the victim is a woman? Are all rapes hate
crimes? (pp. 19-20). Moreover, Jacobs and Potter's suggestion that,
given the demographics of violent crime, hate crime laws might pri
marily affect blacks who victimize whites (pp. 16-17), is an impor
tant warning about the possibilities of unintended consequences.
The book, however, is even more telling in a different sense.
The inability or unwillingness of opponents of hate crime legislation
to see such laws as essentially continuous with much of the rest of
the criminal law reveals the extent to which race (or group) con
sciousness is contested as a strategy for racial (or group) equality in
our society. It is this controversy that makes the lack of "content
neutrality" of hate crime laws visible, even as the normativity of the
rest of the criminal law remains shrouded.
Once this controversy is brought to the surface, the debate
about hate crime laws should take its place next to debates about
affirmative action, single-sex education, and other debates about
group consciousness as a strategy for achieving group equality in
our society. Much of the constitutional debate about hate crime
legislation might be viewed more profitably in these terms.

